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Abstract: Security is a mandatory issue in any network, where sensitive data are transferred safely 
in the required direction. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are the networks formed in hostile areas 
for different applications. Whatever the application, the WSNs must gather a large amount of sen-
sitive data and send them to an authorized body, generally a sink. WSN has integrated with Inter-
net-of-Things (IoT) via internet access in sensor nodes along with internet-connected devices. The 
data gathered with IoT are enormous, which are eventually collected by WSN over the Internet. Due 
to several resource constraints, it is challenging to design a secure sensor network, and for a secure 
IoT it is essential to have a secure WSN. Most of the traditional security techniques do not work 
well for WSN. The merger of IoT and WSN has opened new challenges in designing a secure net-
work. In this paper, we have discussed the challenges of creating a secure WSN. This research re-
views the layer-wise security protocols for WSN and IoT in the literature. There are several issues 
and challenges for a secure WSN and IoT, which we have addressed in this research. This research 
pinpoints the new research opportunities in the security issues of both WSN and IoT. This survey 
climaxes in abstruse psychoanalysis of the network layer attacks. Finally, various attacks on the 
network using Cooja, a simulator of ContikiOS, are simulated. 
Keywords: Denial of Service; Internet-of-Things; routing protocol; low power; lossy network (RPL), 
physical attacks; sybil attacks; Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) 
1. Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a distributive network consisting of tiny sensors 
capable of collecting the data like temperature, humidity, pressure, voice, etc. [1]. These 
remote sensors have a limited energy source, storage, and short radio range. The sensors 
hook up together to form an ad-hoc network that reports the activities on the web, and 
finally, the data collected reach the sink. WSNs find applications in health monitoring, 
disaster management, target tracking, habitat monitoring, and many more. Sensor net-
works comprise tiny sensor nodes with many resource constraints like inadequacy of 
power and data storage. These inadequacies do not allow the use of traditional network 
security techniques in sensor networks. The security issues are more complicated in 
WSNs than wireless communication techniques due to unreliable communication chan-
nels and unattended operations. The existing security protocols are suitable for imple-
menting traditional ad-hoc networks, whereas the sensor network is unique. These 
unique features of a sensor network that are different from the conventional ad-hoc net-
work are [2]: 
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• A sensor network has a higher amount of sensor nodes present in the network than 
the traditional ad-hoc network, with limited nodes. 
• Nodes in the sensor network are deployed very densely to provide better coverage 
of the target area. 
• A sensor network has many resource constraints and is more prone to failure due to 
the harsh environment. 
• There are no global ids of the sensing nodes; the local ids that are valid only for that 
sensor network are responsible for identifying the nodes. 
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) has emerged as a big advance in all the technologies that 
follow the Internet. The market of IoT is expected to grow up to 75 billion by the year 2025. 
In the upcoming years, every person on the earth may have 20–25 personal IoT devices. 
That means IoT is going to have a substantial influence on our lives [3]. WSN has come 
out to be the backbone of IoT, where countless sensor nodes unite the Internet, focusing 
on collaborating with other sensor nodes to monitor and sense their environment. IoT can 
interconnect the environment and people by using WSN in the future [4], resulting in es-
calated environmental apprehension [5]. 
The sensor networks have an inherent feature of unattended nodes, due to which the 
physical attacks play a vital role in sensor network operation. Security undoubtedly is a 
crucial issue in WSN and IoT, mainly for tasked security attacks. For example, no patient 
wants that his confidential health reports to be revealed to the world. In [6], authors have 
reported such an issue caused due to data leakage from misbehaving nodes. To under-
stand the whole security system of WSN and IoT, it is essential to know about the obsta-
cles of sensor network security, security requirements, types of attacks, and possible de-
fensive measures. Methodologies designed for securing WSN will also be relevant for IoT 
[7]. The three essential components of security attacks are prevention, detection, and mit-
igation [8]. This survey aims to suggest layer-wise security attacks on WSN and IoT. This 
survey, according to us, will be beneficial for researchers who want to form secure algo-
rithms for IoT. 
WSN comprises sensor nodes that are capable of low-level communication. Nonethe-
less, on the other hand, IoT contains internet-enabled sensor nodes that are internet-ena-
bled, and hence the data sensed by IoT nodes are directed to the sink, which will also be 
Internet-based. Moreover, IoT networks may also need to interact with the emanating ap-
proaches of cloud computing and big data. This survey paper aims to compile the work 
from various research papers in the field of IoT security. This work discusses WSN and 
IoT protocol stacks by comparing the attacks on different stacks and possible preventive 
measures. Finally, the effect of various attacks on the network’s performance is quantized 
using the Cooja, a simulator of ContikiOS. 
The rest of the manuscript is as follows. Section II presents the IoT history and tech-
nical issues. Section III examines the security characteristics in IoT and WSN. Section IV 
discusses the WSN and IoT standards and protocols. Section V and Section VI illustrate 
open issues of cybersecurity in IoT and security attacks evaluation in ContikiOS. Finally, 
Section V concludes the paper and suggests future works. 
2. IoT History and Technical Issues 
“Internet-of-Things” is a term coined by Kevin Ashton of Proctor and Gamble in 
1999. IoT since then has progressed rapidly into a field that necessitates the interaction of 
objects which have embedded sensors, processors and can communicate with fellow de-
vices to furnish the various automated services [3,9,10]. IoT is not a single technology. It 
is a confluence of real-time computing, actuation, embedded systems, and, most im-
portant, WSN, shown in Figure 1. In our day-to-day life, there are various IoT standalone 
devices such as smartphones, smartwatches, home lighting [11], etc. The upcoming future 
of IoT will aim to use smaller and energy-efficient sensor technology along with state-of-
art communication, data analytics, and advanced actuators to collect and process data 
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more intelligently [11,12]. IoT implementation will increase energy management at homes 
and industry, monitoring consumables, fitness monitoring, etc., is anticipated to become 
ubiquitous [13,14]. 
 
Figure 1. IoT is the union of several technologies. 
The networking infrastructure for cyber-physical systems (CPS) [9] is IoT. The tech-
nological advances in CPS can enable scalability, safety, resiliency, adaptability, and ca-
pability. CPS is modifying the way we communicate with engineered systems. CPS’s do-
mains are aeronautics, transportation, health care, infrastructure, automation, and energy 
[14]. Advances in IoT will impact numerous services and applications, including intelli-
gent transportation, smart homes, industrial IoT, smart agriculture, and retail IoT. These 
IoT-enabled services and applications will also prove to be an economic boom for society 
[14]. The sensor network is a different network, having many resource constraints, and 
thus the implementation of traditional Security into a sensor network is quite problematic. 
Similarly, structuring an IoT network has many technological issues while preparing se-
curity algorithms for IoT networks. Some of the challenges in IoT can be as follows as 
discussed in [15]: 
• Communication: In IoT, wired and wireless communication is used, such as LPWAN, 
ZigBee, etc. 
• Scalability: IoT network comprises many nodes, and naming addressing, and man-
aging many such devices is challenging. 
• Heterogeneity: IoT is a network of various devices from assorted families like actua-
tors, sensors, switches, gateways, mobiles, etc. Different devices engage different al-
gorithms, protocols, and circuitry. 
• Energy Consumption: In the case of both WSN and IoT, energy is a most challenging 
constraint. Thus, the researchers always struggle to design the algorithm for IoT and 
WSN with minimum processing requirements. 
• Interoperability: IoT network consists of various devices, which exchange data and 
collaborate among themselves. Thus, there is always a need for a predefined stand-
ard for data exchange. 
• Self-Awareness: IoT devices should automate autonomously in such a way that there 
is minimum human intervention required. 
• Data Privacy: Data Privacy is another crucial issue in IoT. The IoT network is de-
signed for both public and private affairs. As described in [16,17], IoT devices may 
share the information to the sink in a public network, whereas transmitting location 
information can be risky in a private network. 
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3. Security Characteristics in IoT and WSN 
IoT and WSN are special wireless networks, and they are structureless networks 
comprising thousands of tiny sensor nodes. The sensing nodes collect the data, and after 
several data conditioning techniques, the data are sent to the gateways and finally to the 
base station. Some of the features in IoT and WSN, which make them even more vulnera-
ble to security attacks are listed below. 
• Organization: Sensors do not possess any fixed structure, and the location of the sen-
sors is random. The solution to the failures in the network is the self-organizing be-
havior of WSN and IoT network by discovering the nearest neighbour [18]. 
• Resource Constraints: IoT and WSN have many resource constraints like restricted 
communication bandwidth, storage capacity, and processing powers, which permit 
the utilization of whippersnapper security methods only. These security methods of-
fer security from external attacks only [19]. 
• Central Control: The central system, the base station, control the sensing nodes. The 
data gathered by the nodes flow in the network depending upon the routing algo-
rithm applied. The major problem in this approach is that most routing algorithms’ 
development is without any conquer thoughtfulness of security measures. 
• Flow Control: The transmission flow is acquainted with enhancing network perfor-
mance degradation by analyzing the number of transmission errors and quality of 
flow [20]. 
• Environmental Issues: Sensor nodes are deployed in an open environment, accessible 
to the antagonists; this may result in introducing one or many compromised nodes, 
which disturbs the network externally and may take the network’s total control, lead-
ing to the complete fallout of the network. 
The characteristics described above point towards the security mechanism(s) require-
ment to optimize the security requirements of IoT and WSN and contribute to increasing 
the reliability and efficiency of the network. 
3.1. Security Requirements 
IoT and WSN pose some inherent properties of conventional wireless communica-
tion and have several exclusive features. That means that the security requirements for 
IoT and WSN circumscribe both traditional wireless network and sensor network require-
ments. 
3.1.1. Data Confidentiality 
In network security, there should always be data confidentiality. There is always an 
addressing problem in any network security system. There are many examples, such as 
military, where sensitive data are transferred between the nodes, the data must be trans-
ferred to the correct node and not to the neighbouring enemy node. The distribution of 
keys requires a secure channel and addressing for sensitive data. The IoT network also 
has public information like public keys and node identities. To protect the network against 
traffic analysis attacks, this general information should also be encrypted to some extent. 
Data confidentiality can be achieved by encrypting the data before broadcasting [21]. 
3.1.2. Data Integrity and Data Freshness 
Data confidentiality makes it unable for antagonists to steal the information, but this 
does not assure that the data are secure. The data can be tampered with by the antagonists 
even after data confidentiality by changing the accurate data. A malicious node can ma-
nipulate the information within the packet, and the reviewer will then receive the new 
packet. The malicious nodes, but the harsh communication environment, also result in 
damage or loss of data. Thus, data integrity is needed to ensure that the data received are 
not altered [22]. 
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Along with data confidentiality and freshness, it is essential for security purposes 
that the data coming from the sensors to the receiver should be fresh and recent. This 
means that the action taken by the base station is based on current information. For secu-
rity purposes shared critical approach is applied, data freshness is a vital aspect. These 
shared keys keep changing in time, and the new keys must be propagated on the network; 
in such cases, data freshness is essential. Some time is required for propagating the new 
key within the network, and it is easy for the antagonists to attack the network while the 
process of key distribution is taking place. 
3.1.3. Self-Organization 
WSN is a particular type of ad-hoc network, which should be malleable enough to 
adapt according to the application and area where the sensor nodes are deployed. WSNs 
have the fundamental property of being self-healing and self-organizing according to the 
situation [2]. For network management, no fixed infrastructure is available in the sensor 
network. These inherent properties of WSNs are significant challenges for the security of 
the sensor network. There are several symmetric encryption techniques proposed in 
[23,24]. For applying public-key cryptography, a public key distribution mechanism is 
also required. The distributed sensor network must be self-organized for multi-hop rout-
ing to build confidence among the sensors and key management. Therefore, it implies that 
there may be a few unavoidable attacks if a sensor network lacks self-organization. 
3.1.4. Time Synchronization 
There is some form of time synchronization in all WSN and IoT networks depending 
upon their design. 
• For power conservation, the radio of the individual sensing node is turned off. 
• Sensors compute an end-to-end delay of packets, as the packets are transferred be-
tween a pair of sensor nodes. 
• Group synchronization is required for the tracking application. 
The authors propose synchronization protocols for security in [25] for group syn-
chronization, pairwise synchronization, and multi-hop sender-receiver synchronization. 
3.1.5. Authentication 
Antagonists can reshape the packets and even change the whole packet stream by 
infusing additional packets into it. Thus, the receiver’s responsibility is to ensure that the 
data based on the decision is authentic and appropriate. In WSN and IoT networks, au-
thentication is necessary for controlling the sensing node duty cycle, network reprogram-
ming, etc. The authentication of data helps the receiver ensure whether the data received 
is from the genuine sender. When there is a two-party communication, the authenticity 
can be checked by sharing a secret key and message authentication code (MAC) for all 
data being communicated. The transmission in WSN and IoT networks is between many 
sensing nodes to a receiver or sink. For secure communication, there is a need for secure 
broadcast protocol; one such approach is given by authors in [26] named µTESLA, which 
provides asymmetric key cryptography. In this approach, the message key broadcasted 
by the sender is generated by a secret key, and the receiver will buffer the received packet 
until the secret key is retrieved. Once the private key is retrieved, the receiver can authen-
ticate the received packet is from the genuine sender and not from any antagonist. The 
drawback of µTESLA is that for authentication, before broadcasting the secret key, some 
basic information must be unicast among the sensing nodes. Although several protocols 
provide secure communication in WSN and IoT networks, none is secure enough to pro-
vide the desired security. A comparison among such claimed secure protocols is described 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Comparison of secure routing protocols for broadcast authentication. 
Protocols Routing Confidentiality Broadcast Authentication 
SNEP [26] Flat Yes No 
LKHW [27] Flat/Hierarchical Yes No 
µTESLA [26] Flat/Hierarchical Yes Yes 
Multilevel Key Chains [28] Flat/Hierarchical No Yes 
LEAP Hierarchy [29] Flat/Hierarchical Yes Yes 
3.2. Security Vulnerabilities 
WSN and IoT have a wireless communication medium, a deficiency of physical se-
curity and many resource limitations. These all lead WSN and IoT to be vulnerable to 
many external or internal security attacks. Considering external attacks, the attacker may 
not have access to the node directly but is capable of tampering or replacing the actual 
node with the malicious node to empower malicious actions and disturb the natural per-
formance of the network. On the other hand, in internal attacks, the attacker has access to 
the internal protocols and thus promotes various malicious activities. There is no border-
line to differentiate clearly between internal and external attacks. In this research, we give 
a classification of multiple attacks concerning different layers of IoT. The layered architec-
ture of WSN and IoT, as described in [4], has five layers, namely physical layer, data link 
layer, network layer, transport, and application layer. Figure 2 depicts the layered archi-
tecture of IoT. 
1. Physical Layer Attacks: In the physical layer, which is the lowest layer in the sack, 
the physical characteristics of the network are stipulated. The wireless communica-
tion medium has a broadcast nature, making this layer vulnerable to node tampering, 
hardware hacking, jamming, and even eavesdropping. 
2. Data Link Layer (DLL) Attacks: The DLL facilitates the nodes with shared resource 
usage, error control, and data flow control. The attacks in DLL are more likely to have 
pertained within the medium access control (MAC) sublayer of DLL. The standard 
attacks in this layer are collision and jamming. 
3. Network Layer Attacks: This layer caters to the routing of the data packets within the 
network. The presence of any malicious node can hamper the normal functioning of 
the network and initiates attacks like hello flood, replication attack, black hole, worm-
hole, and selective forwarding. 
4. Transport Layer Attacks: This layer leads to reliable transportation in the network. 
Due to attacks, the connection between the nodes can be compromised, giving rise to 
energy drain attacks, desynchronize attacks, and data integrity attacks. 
5. Application Layer Attacks: The application layer interacts directly with the end-user 
and performs data aggregations. This layer is prone to attacks that can affect the ap-
plication programs. 




Figure 2. IoT layered architecture. 
3.3. Security Structure 
After learning about all the possible security issues in the sensor network, we will 
now discuss the possible defensive measures. Table 2 enlists some of the security schemes 
in the literature, along with the type of attacks prohibited by them and their correspond-
ing network architecture. In this section, the critical establishment is discussed, which is 
the base of the security systems in WSN and IoT, followed by the defence against DoS 
attacks, secure broadcasting, and defence against attacks on routing protocols. 
Table 2. Classification of attacks, with their consequences. 
Security Scheme Attacks Prohibited 
JAM [30] DoS Attack 
Wormhole [31] DoS Attack 
Statistical En-Route Filtering [32] Information Spoofing 
Random Key Pre-distribution [33] Sybil Attack 
Bidirectional Verification [34] Hello, Flood Attack, 
On Communication Security [35] Data Spoofing 
TIK [36] Wormhole Attack and Data Spoofing 
Random Key Distribution [37] 
Data Spoofing, Attacks in Transmitting 
information 
REWARD [38] Blackhole attacks 
µ TESLA [26] Data Spoofing and Attacks on reply to messages 
Range Based Secure Localisation [39] Malicious anchors 
3.3.1. Key Establishment 
Key establishment is the foundation to assure that a security system exists in a WSN 
and IoT. The target of key establishment is to create an essential key between the sensing 
nodes. This security feature is versatile enough to support the addition and subtraction of 
the sensor nodes in the network. Symmetric-key cryptography is the base of key establish-
ment. Figure 3 shows the taxonomy of the key establishment schemes in WSN and IoT. The 
key establishment in the sensor network is broadly done based on network structure and 
the probability of key sharing. In the network structure, the key establishment is done based 
on centralized and distributed key schemes. In the centralized key method, a single, 
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centralized body, known as a key distribution centre (KDC), the keys’ distribution, gener-
ation, and regeneration. One such scheme in literature is named logical key hierarchy 
(LKH) [27]. In this approach, the base station works as KDC. The drawback of the KDC 
scheme is that the single distribution center cannot handle all sensing nodes for a dense 
network. If the central controlling body fails, then the whole security system of the network 
will be adversely affected. The other approach for a Network structure-based key estab-
lishment scheme is the distributed key scheme where different controllers handle the key 
distribution, generation, and regeneration. Thus, the failure of one controller is not respon-
sible for the loss of the whole security system. The overall security system is robust in the 
case of a distributed key establishment scheme. Some distributed key mechanisms in the 
literature are LEAP [29], BROSK [40], random key scenarios [24], etc. 
 
Figure 3. Key establishment protocols. 
3.3.2. Defense against DoS Attacks 
Table 3 enlists the layers of a sensor network and the common attacks at different 
layers with possible defensive measures. At the physical layer, the expected attacks on the 
sensor network are jamming and tampering. The possible solution for jamming is to re-
route the traffic after identifying the jammed portion of the network. In [30], the authors 
have given a practical approach to overcome jamming. In this proposed approach, the 
nodes in the perimeter of the jammed portion of the network report jamming to their 
neighbours, which cooperate with the other nodes for forming new routing paths. The 
standard attacks in the link layer of the sensor network are a collision of packets, exhaus-
tion due to low data rates, collision of the packets, and unfairness due to frame size. These 
attacks can be overcome by introducing error-correcting codes and increasing data rates. 
Flooding denial of service occurs at the transport layer, which can be defended by client 
puzzles given by Aura et al. in [41]. In Table 4, some of the elucidations against DoS at-
tacks are abridged. 
Table 3. Layer-wise cyber attacks in WSN and IoT. 
Layer Attacks Outcomes of Network operation’s Proposed Solutions for Mitigation 
Physical Layer 
Basic Jammer 
Congestion, signal distortion, 
draining of nodes’ energy 
Admittance to the sensitive data. 
Spread Spectrum [42], JAM[30], 
Swarm intelligence [43], Wormhole 
technique [44] 
Node Tapering 
Tampering sensitive information like 
routing tables and cryptographic 
keys. 
JTAG [45], Camouflaging [46] 
Data Link Layer Hardware Hacking Nodes become vulnerable to attacks. Error correction codes [46] 
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Collision Increasing congestion Irregular detection of motes [47] 
Denial of sleep Interference TDM 
De-Synchronization Packet Loss 6TiSCH [48] 
6LoWPAN No end-to end security 6LowPseC [49] 
Network Layer 
Jamming 
Congestion, signal distortion, 
draining of node’s energy 
Multipath routing [50], Active trust 
routing [51], REWARD routing [52], 
MOADV [53], BAMBi [54] 
Replay Attack 
Increase in congestion and 
interference, route disturbance and 
fake error messages, data loss, and 
traffic reduction 
Source authorisation [42], Multipath 
routing [47] 
Black-hole 
Routing loops, repulsing network 
traffic Data loss, and reduction of 
traffic 
Source routing algorithm [55] 
Spoofed Selective For-
warding 
Data loss and reduction of traffic, 
conciliatory of transmission routes 
Identity verification, Isolation, [33], 
Indirect validation [47] 
Sinkhole Wormhole 
Transmission of data to the wrong 
destinations 
Multi-level clustering [56], ID-based 
public keys [57], Location-based key 
management [58] 
Sybil Attack Hello 
Flood Hello Flood ID-based public keys [56] 
Node Replication Hello Flood ID-based public keys [56] 
RPL rank 
Disturbance in the transmission 
routes Collision, false transmission 
routes, and energy degradation 
VeRA [59], TRAIL [60] 
RPL DODAG 
Eavesdropping, disturbance in the 




Failed communication links and dis-
turbed transmission routes 
Authentication via header [30] 
Energy Drain 
False messages can tamper with the 
overall functioning of the network. 
Light-weighted algorithm for authen-
tication [62] 





Extinguishes the capacity of the 
network to perform the expected 
Collision and energy draining 
Collective secret [32] 
Attacks on Reliability 
Path-based DoS 
Extinguishes the capacity of the 
network to perform the expected 
Collision and energy draining 
One-Way hash chains [37] 
CoAP exploit 
Extinguishes the capacity of the 
network to perform the expected 
Collision and energy draining 
Employment of DTLS [65] 
Multi-Layer 
Man in the middle 
Admittance to the sensitive data 
Rules out the capacity of the 
network 
Key pre-distribution [23,37] 
Denial of Service 
Admittance to the sensitive data 
Rules out the capacity of the 
network 
Link Layer encryption [26,66] 




Admittance to the sensitive data 
Rules out the capacity of the net-
work 
Sensor-Wave communication [26] 
Table 4. Defensive measures against DOS attacks in WSN. 
DoS Attacks Possible Defense Approach 
Physical tampering Using tamper-resistant nodes 
Radio Interference Using Spread-Spectrum communication 
Black-hole Using Multiple routing paths 
Misdirection Using source authorization 
Denying Channel Using error correction codes 
Flooding Restraining total connections 
3.3.3. Secure Broadcasting and Multicasting 
The communication pattern in WSN and IoT networks can be 1-to- N or N-to-1, or 
N-to-M, other than traditional point-to-point communication. The security issues in WSN 
and IoT are also due to the secret key, which is needed by the sensing nodes to decrypt 
the broadcast message. It has already been discussed in the previous sections that both 
WSN and IoT networks have severe resource constraints, so reducing the overhead broad-
casting of messages is done. Broadcasting or multicasting in WSN and IoT networks are 
done with the help of the security key so that the messages are received by the authorized 
receivers only. The security, distribution, and generation are managed by various key 
management schemes [67]. 
3.3.4. Defense against Attacks on Routing Protocols 
Table 3 enlists the various routing protocols that secure routing in the WSN and IoT 
network (the IoT-specific attacks are written in italic). SNEP [26] is a flat routing that keeps 
confidentiality, with good scalability, and provides point-to-point authentication. SNEP 
does not provide broadcast authentication. LKHW [27] is another secure routing algo-
rithm having limited scalability but provides good confidentiality. Perrig et al. in [26] have 
given another routing protocol, µ TESLA that has medium scalability and provides secure 
broadcast. In [16] multilevel key chain scheme is introduced for broadcast authentication 
and has good scalability. Zhu et al. in [29] introduced a hierarchical routing scheme for 
both point-to-point and broadcast authentication, with medium scalability. 
4. WSN and IoT Standards and Protocols 
In the previous sections, the security requirements for the WSN and IoT are dis-
cussed. Figure 4 depicts the various protocols following the different layers. These proto-
cols follow IETF standardization [68] and can be layered on top of each other. 




Figure 4. Communication standards and protocols following different layers of IoT. 
4.1. IEEE 802.15.4 for Physical Layer Communication 
Wireless communication supports low-power, low data rate communication, and 
IEEE 802.15.4 [69] defines wireless communication’s physical and MAC layers. This IEEE 
standard has properties like high flexibility, low cost, and low power consumption, mak-
ing it suitable for many industrial and research-based applications, health monitoring [70], 
and home automation systems [71]. The archetype IEEE 802.15.4 has been facilitated with 
time and has now become IEEE 802.15.4e. The new version supports channel hopping in 
time synchronization. Figure 5 shows the detailed frame structure of IEEE 802.15.4. As far 
as the security mechanism is concerned, it applies only to the MAC layer, not the physical 
layer. 
• IEEE 802.15.4 (Physical Layer): This standard patronizes 16 channels in the industrial, 
scientific, and medical (ISM) band and 11 channels in 868/915 MHz, low-frequency 
band. The various modulation schemes are used to lower down the co-channel inter-
ferences [72]. 
• IEEE 802.15.4 (MAC Layer): This standard utilizes carrier sense multiple access-col-
lision avoidances (CSMA- CD) and supervises the admittance to time slots and phys-
ical channels. The network topologies used here are cluster, peer-to-peer, and star 
[73]. The IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer has a security model that meets the four security 
prerequisites, i.e., data encryption, access control, sequential freshness, and frame in-
tegrity [74]. Several security suits endure these security prerequisites, like the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) [72]. AES has different modes of operations, 
namely counter mode (CTR), cypher block chaining (CBC-MAC), and authentication 
and encrypts block cypher mode (CCM). CTR, CBC-MAC, and CCM support the 
length of 32,64 and 128 bits [74]. Table 5 shows the comparison of security by a piece 
security suite. 
• IEEE 802.15.4e (MAC Layer): This standard supports multi-hopping by using a time-
synchronized mesh protocol. The devices are also synchronized to choose the correct 
nearest neighbour along with the channel. IEEE 802.15.4e provides security against 
reactive jamming and sweep [75]. 




Figure 5. IEEE 802.15.4 frame on 2.4GHz Network. 
Table 5. Security Suits for IEEE 802.15.4. 
Security Suite Data Encryption Access Control Seq. Fresh. Frame Integration 
None No No No No 
CTR Yes Yes Yes No 
CBC-MAC-128 No Yes No Yes 
CBC-MAC-64 No Yes No Yes 
CBC-MAC-32 No Yes No Yes 
CCM-128 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CCM-64 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CCM-32 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4.2. B-MAC 
Berkeley media access control (B-MAC) [76] is an energy-efficient protocol that uses 
the sleep/listening agenda. In this protocol, the communication channel is chosen ran-
domly. Not all the time receiver is in active mode. Whenever the transmitter has data to 
send to the receiver, it transmits a long preamble that the receiver can hear, and then the 
receiver becomes ready to receive data [77]. The disadvantage of B MAC is using the long 
preamble by the transmitter and overhearing by the receiver. As far as security is con-
cerned, there is no well-defined security mechanism for B-MAC. Still, like other MAC 
layer protocols, it is vulnerable to collision and jamming during different operations. 
However, B-MAC is immune to periodic jamming, as it uses a recurring cycle for listening 
only and not for sending. 
4.3. LoWPAN 
6LoWPAN stands for IPv6 over low power wireless personal area network, and it is 
good at offering ecumenical Internet connectivity to the low-power wireless nodes. 6LoW-
PAN has enabled the usage of IPv6 for low-energy wireless communication devices [72]. 
It has also made it possible to broadcast IPv6 over IEEE 802.15.4; this is an adaptation layer 
[78]. The job of the adaptation layer is to break the IPV6 into smaller sections, as IPv6 
supports 1280 bytes, as compared to 127 bytes long packets in IEEE 802.15.4. The next task 
of the adaptation layer is to squeeze the header for the optimized usage of restricted 
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payload space. The significant advantage of 6LoWPAN multi-hop communication and its 
major disadvantage is that it provides optimal routing solutions for limited resource and 
power communication. This limitation leads to the use of RPL. 
4.4. RPL 
Routing protocol for low power and lossy network (RPL) is distance vector protocol, 
and it backs many forms of link-layer technologies; IEEE 82.15.4 is one of them [79]. RPL 
is a self-healing protocol. In WSN’s, RPL specifies two elements: WSN nodes, hosts, or 
arbitrates routers, and the other element is local border routers (LBR) [80]. LBR supports 
packet transmission from the Internet to the host. RPL supports point-to-point, point-to-
multipoint, and multipoint-to-point topologies. 
4.5. BCP 
Backpressure collection protocol (BCP) is a protocol that works in real-time experi-
ments, and it is a low-overhead protocol and highly scalable [81]. In BCP, there is no ex-
plicit path figuring between the source and destination, but the dynamic backpressure 
routing is the central working concept of this protocol. In other words, it is routing with-
out routes. The nodes compute the weights for all the neighbouring nodes when the for-
warding queue is not empty. The node then forwards the packet to the neighbour node 
having the highest positive weight. In case none of the neighbouring nodes has a positive 
weight, the sending node, in that case, waits for the back-off period and then recalculates 
the weights. BPL works on the concept of LIFO (last-in-first-out). On the other hand, the 
null packets are sent to determine the virtual queue whenever the forwarding key is 
empty. 
4.6. CTP 
As the name implies, collection tree protocol (CTP) is a tree-based routing scheme, 
which does not guarantee 100% honest delivery, but it is a best-effort protocol. CTP pro-
vides many-to-one and one-to-many communication [82]. This protocol prevents dupli-
cation of packets. CTP uses ETX to route packets from different routes to the tree, as CTP 
is an address-free protocol. The ETX of a node is the sum of its parents and ETX of the link 
to its parents. When there are many valid routes, then the route with minimum ETX is 
considered for transmission. In the case of disparity in the topology, routes are updated 
and not periodically. 
4.7. CoAP 
CoAP stands for constrained application protocol and backs the application-layer 
communication and web transfer within IoT [83]. CoAP is an advanced HTTP version 
(hypertext transfer protocol) and uses Representational State Transfer (REST) architec-
ture. The resource requirement of CoAP is lesser than HTTP, which makes it less complex 
than its denser cousin HTTP [83]. Figure 6 shows the protocol stack along with the mes-
sage and header format of CoAP. The architecture of CoAP is consists of two parts, i.e., 
message layer and request-response layer. Table 6 summarises the various protocols, their 
significant attacks, and the aforementioned defensive methods. 




Figure 6. CoAP protocol stack. 
Table 6. Summary of attacks against various communication standards and protocols and existing defensive 
measures. 






Message Integrity Code (MIC) [74] 
MIC has built-in CBC-MAC suits, 
which increases the overhead and 
delays the frame transmission. 
Reactive jamming and 
sweep 
IEEE802.15.4e [75] 
Channel hopping and secured ACK. 
Do not ensure defence for wideband 
jamming 
Denying of data 
through physical and 
MAC header 
Encrypted data payload [75] It Covers MAC payloads, not the 
headers. 
B-MAC 
Denial of sleep attack 
Broadcast attack defense, anti-replay 
protection and link-layer 
authentication [84] 
Attackers are awake most of the time in 
the case of B-MAC protocol. 
Statistical Jamming Reduction in preamble size [77] 
Reducing the preamble size too much 
overcomes its function. 
6LoWPAN 
Authentication Attack Framework for network access 
control [85] 
Enables one border router and 
provides identification to nodes 
Eavesdropping and 
spoofing, Man in the 
middle 
IPsec [86] 
The end-to-end secure mechanism, the 
key mechanism, is pre-shared but not 
very flexible. 
Fragmentation attack 
Timestamps are given to bidi 
reactional and unidirectional 
fragmented packets [87]. Use of split 
buffer scheme [88] 
Redefinition of fragmented packets. 





To store graphical location 
of sensor nodes, a distributed hash 
table (DHT) is used [89] 
Non-scalable and challenging to 
identify the node location securely. 
Wormhole Attack 
The separate key for each segment of 
the network [89]. 
End-to-end delay and high jitter 
Selective forwarding 
attack 
Lightweight Heartbeat [89] 
No defence after attack detection. The 
delivery ratio is improved, but energy 
consumption increases. 
Rank attack selective 
forwarding altered 
information 
RPL resilient technique [90] 
TRAIL [59] and VeRa [59] 
SVELTE [91] 
Dependent on network size and do not 
require cryptography. 
Overhead is small, but the positive rate 
is not 100% due to false alarms 
BCP 
Selective forwarding, 
black-hole and multiple 
attacks 
Secure backpressure algorithm [92] 
The throughput performance is 
maintained under attacks. 
Data Modifications, 
False routes and data 
modification 
VAR trust model [93] Overhead increased 
CTP 
Data alteration, data 
loss, sinkhole and 
selective for warding 
Kinesis [94,95] 
An automated reaction scheme for 
attacks and abnormalities. 
Segmentation of neighbourhoods gives 
rise to redundant data. 
5. Open Issues of Cybersecurity in IoT 
IoT cybersecurity is in its early phase of development, and thus there is a need for 
further research and investigation in this field [96]. Table 7 enlists some of the open issues 
in the field of cybersecurity in IoT. The issues enrolled in this survey are layer-wise but 
are not limited to the problems listed in Table 7. 
• Wireless Communication Security: Wireless communication cannot ensure secure 
communication on its own [97]. Also, the protection of the physical layer cannot en-
tirely prevent security infringement. Secure higher-order layers can provide the 
safety of the physical layer. A primary authentication mechanism is necessary for any 
wireless communication. The key size should be long enough to beat the attackers, 
and the key updating should be done frequently to protect the key identity from the 
attackers [98,99]. 
• Sensor-Based Threats: Authors in [100] have pinpointed the issues of sensor-based 
threats in the IoT network. There is a lack of Security available at the sensor nodes, 
which makes them vulnerable to attackers. The attackers can extract information 
from the sensor nodes and inject malware to the nodes without being noticed. 
• Defence against Botnet: QBot botnets were discovered in 2014, eventually infected 
about 1 million IoT devices. Like a computer virus, QBot botnets have precursors 
named Mirai botnet and Torii botnet. Botnets result from weaknesses of IoT like bad 
user habits and lack of rigid security precautions [101]. 
• Integration with cloud/fog: IoT is a heterogeneous network consisting of various 
sensing modes. These different nodes collect massive data, which has to be stored 
and processed from time to time. The data communication techniques used in IoT 
have to be robust enough to avoid the management issues in handling the diverse 
data collection done by the different nodes. These situations make it difficult for 
cloud computing to cope effectively and efficiently with data handling and pro-
cessing in IoT. The sole use of cloud computing in data handling can result in high 
bandwidth consumption and high communication cost. It is crucial to take care of 
the cloud data while handling and securing sensitive data. Due to these problems, 
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the fog computing paradigm and cloud computing in IoT [12]. Integrating fog com-
puting and cloud computing is a substantial open issue for designing a secure IoT 
network. 
• Other Concerns: The Internet of Drones is a recent application of IoT in both research 
and industry. Authors in [102] have been concerned that drones are commonly de-
signed without considering the basic security concepts, making it a security issue in 
IoT. The number of IoT vendors is increasing with the day-by-day increase in users 
of IoT, but the lack of a security framework for the vendors makes the IoT network 
more prone to cyber-attacks. Authors in [103,104] have analysed this growing con-
cern in their research and have stressed that this security issue must be considered in 
the upcoming study. 
Table 7. Open Issues for cybersecurity in IoT. 
Open Issues Source Layer 
Wireless Communication security Burg et.al [99] Physical and MAC 
Sensor-based threats Sikder et.al [100] Physical and MAC 
Defence against botnet attacks Torii botnet [101] Application 
Lack of security framework Zhang et.al [103] Application 
Integration with cloud/fog Butun et.al [12] All Layers 
Security of Internet of drones Lin et.al [102] All Layers 
6. Security Attacks Evaluation in ContikiOS 
Depending upon the manoeuvring nature of IoT, they are prone to a wide variety of 
attacks, as discussed in the previous section. Most of the time, the nodes are deployed in 
the approachable region, making the network more accessible for attackers. Other than 
these, malicious nodes can be easily added to the network to infect it. The best way of 
avoiding DoS [105] is to understand the consequences and impingement of attacks on the 
network’s performance. A better way of designing a secure and lively sensor network is 
precise and profligate simulations of IoT. In this research, we use Cooja, a simulator of 
Contiki O.S. [106]. Cooja is very famous among researchers in the field of sensing net-
works. Our main objective behind using Cooja is to analyse the possibility of exploiting it 
to measure the impact of attacks and the development of security measures. In this re-
search, we examine the effect of internal attacks on RPL based sensor networks. 
6.1. Network Model 
Let the devices in the network communicate in a multi-hop fashion and the sensor 
network 𝑁 = 𝑆 ∪ 𝐶. 𝑆 is the set of sensor nodes responsible for generating and forward-
ing the data packets, and 𝐶 the set of data collecting roots. The set of one-hop neighbours 
is given by 𝑁 ⊆ 𝑁  and node 𝑥 ∈ 𝑁 . The communication time slot is 𝑡  and 𝑡 ∈1,2,3, … . , 𝑡 , 𝑡 < ∞. All the potential links are given 𝐿  such that all the node pairs 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝐿, and the whole network is sculptured as a time-weighted graph 𝐺 (𝑁, 𝐿). In the 
possible connections, 𝐿 let 𝑥 be the source node and 𝑦 be the destination node. Adopt-
ing the standard layered architecture of WSN and IoT, we address the following attacks 
in our simulation: hello flood attack, selective forwarding attack, replay attack, black hole 
attack, Sybil attack, and sinkhole attack. 
6.2. Execution of Attacks 
Let 𝑥 be the infected node, and at times t it can perform one of the following attacks. 
• Hello Flood Attack: Here, 𝑥  It broadcasts the hello packet every 15 M.S. and causes 
the collision. 
• Selective Forwarding Attack: This 𝑥  deliberately fails to forward data packets from 
neighbours, and a set of neighbour’s changes every 50 s. 
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• Replay Attack: Here 𝑥  overhears traffic from the nearest neighbour and transmis-
sion in the replay. 
• Blackhole Attack: The infected node xa miscarries the packets received from its one-
hop neighbour. 
• Sybil Attacks: Here, xa will copy the identity of the neighbouring node and thus, the 
packet to be sent to y will also be sent to xa. 
• Sinkhole Attack: The node xa publicise that it is a sink node. 
6.3. Valuation of Attacks 
In this section, we discuss the effect of every attack on the performance of the net-
work. Table 8 gives all the simulation parameters. The deployment of the nodes is ran-
domly in the Cooja. The simulation is done in two phases; in the first phase, there is no 
malicious activity, and in the second phase, a malicious node is included in the network. 
Figure 7 shows the simulation environment. 
 
Figure 7. Simulation environment. 
Table 8. Simulation parameters. 
Parameters Values 
Simulator Cooja, simulator of Contiki O.S. 
Radio Environment Unit Disk Graph (UDG) 
Type of nodes Arago system, Wismote mote 
Number of nodes 300 (Contiki MAC) and 1 sink node Malicious Nodes 
Physical Layer IEEE802.15.4 
MAC Layer ContikiMAC 
Network Layer Contiki RPL 
Transport Layer UDP Simulation duration 
Sending rate One packet every 5 sec 
The red node is the malicious node, and the green node is the sink node. The mali-
cious node is placed in such a way that it impacts the performance of the network. To 
analyse the execution of RPL in the comportment of the malicious node, we employ the 
following matrices: 
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• Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): PDR is the ratio of packets successfully received by the 
sink and the number of nodes sent by the source node. Figure 8 shows the PDR vs. 
number of attackers. According to the graph, the attacks that reduce PDR are selec-
tive forwarding, blackhole, sinkhole, replay, and hello flood attacks. At the same 
time, the Sybil attack does not affect the PDR with an increase in the number of at-
tackers. 
• End-to-end Delay (E2E): E2E is the time taken by the data packet to reach the desti-
nation or sink from the source. Figure 9 shows the effect on E2E with the increase in 
attackers. The attacks that increase E2E are replay attacks, hello flood attacks. On the 
other hand, the attacks that reduce the E2E are selective forwarding, sinkhole, and 
blackhole. The attack that does not change either PDR or E2E is the Sybil attack. 
The simulation results can be categorised into the following three categories: 
• Blackhole, selective forwarding and sinkhole attacks reduce PDR and E2E delay and 
faster delivery as the malicious node drops data. 
• Hello flood and replay attack increase E2E but decreases PDR as the total number of 
packets increase. 
• Sybil attacks do not affect any matrix drastically, as some other matrices are required. 
 
Figure 8. Packet delivery ratio vs. no. of attackers. 




Figure 9. End-to-end delay vs. no. of attackers. 
6.4. Endorsement for Using ContikiOS in Designing Countermeasures 
The regular operation of an IoT can be relentlessly disturbed by various attacks. By 
encompassing the features of Cooja, we quantified and expediently measured this dis-
turbance. This apprehension of the behaviour and impact is required for protecting the 
network from unwanted attacks. In this simulation environment, we have reconnoitred 
two different metrics, but there are many other metrics. The measurement of counter-
measures will allow the researchers to build resilience towards the attacks on the network 
before deploying the sensor network. 
7. Conclusions 
IoT is growing at a very rapid pace day by day. The latest research has extended IoT 
applications in cyber-physical systems, cloud-based systems, intelligent communities, 
and many more. IoT comprises a large number of heterogeneous devices. Thus, reliability, 
scalability and transparency are the key issues that have to be solved. Both high and low-
level architecture security needs conceptualisation. This survey deals with studying the 
challenges for providing secure data transfer and aggregation in sensor networks. There 
are various resource constraints in WSN and IoT that make it impossible the use tradi-
tional security systems. The exclusively designed protocols for secure sensor networks 
should make the system safe without increasing the overheads on the network. The future 
security protocols should be flexible enough to provide security on all the layers of the 
sensor network without harming the efficiency and increasing the power consumption. 
In addition to the survey, we have also undertaken a small simulation using Cooja, a sim-
ulator of ContikiOS that appropriates the analysis of the network’s performance in the 
comportment of malicious nodes/activities. Several attacks can hamper the overall perfor-
mance of any sensor network; this survey tries to enlist them and compare them. In the 
future, we would like to create such a sensor network that has resilience towards built-in 
attacks, and the actual deployment shall take place after considering the possible attacks 
on the network to make a WSN and IoT as secure as possible. 
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